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Abstract
We develop a dynamic model in which rms choose their optimal nancing, invest-
ment, dividends, and cash holdings while facing costly equity issuance, debt and capital
adjustments costs, and taxed interest on cash balances. We solve the model numerically
to estimate the volatility of payout and optimal level of cash holdings. Comparing these
results with a large sample of U.S. rms from 1988 to 2007, we show that on average rms
excessively smooth their payout while maintaining larger than optimal levels of cash (excess
cash) on their balance sheets. We further extend the base-case model to capture the eect of
a manager, who perceives a cost to cutting payout. Applying simulated method of moments
(SMM) to the dynamic model we infer the magnitude of this downward adjustment cost.
In particular, we nd that a managerial preference for payout smoothing leads to increased
accumulation of excess cash. Estimated payout consistency cost is larger for rms which are
larger, have more dispersed analyst forecasts, which compensate their CEOs with low pay-
performance packages, have larger institutional holdings, and pay larger fractions of their
payout as dividends. Applying SMM to a recent subsample of the data (2002-2006), we
show that the parameter of managerial preference for consistent payout continue to account
for a similar equity value loss of approximately 7%.
JEL Classication: G31; G35; G32; C15
Keywords: Corporate Payout Policy; Payout Smoothing; Simulated Method of Moments
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1 Introduction
Since Lintner (1956) it has been widely acknowledged that managers have a tendency to smooth
corporate dividends.1 While it is well understood that rms prefer to practice a consistent pay-
out policy, there is no clear explanation regarding why managers choose to smooth dividends,
nor does there exist compelling evidence that this behavior enhances shareholder value. An-
other outstanding puzzle in corporate nance, is the question of why corporations accumulate
excessive liquid assets.2 This gap in our understanding persists despite the close ties decisions
on corporate cash holdings have with strategic corporate decisions, in particular payout policy.
Given the close relationship between corporate payout and saving policies, these two puzzles
should to be addressed simultaneously.3 In this paper, using an agency explanation, we shed
light on the payout smoothing puzzle in cooperation with the excess cash puzzle. We study how
manager-shareholder conicts, more specically a manager's perceived cost associated with pay-
out reductions, distort corporate payout and saving decisions. We also estimate the magnitude
of this cost as well as the shareholder value loss due to this distortion.
Corporate payout, savings, nancing and investment policies are necessarily intertwined de-
cisions made by a manager while taking the future of the rm into account. Under a residual
payout policy, corporate savings and nancing decisions are optimally selected, after which rms
distribute the remaining cash to their shareholders. The savings decisions should be designed
to balance trade-os between internal and external resources for nancing current and future
investments in the presence of costly access to capital markets while also considering the tax on
distributions to investors. However, increasing cash holdings is associated with a tax penalty on
interest earned and a postponement of immediate distributions.
However, the empirical literature has suggested that managers who are responsible for both
nancial and real decisions of the rm, may deviate from the rst-best policies by reducing
corporate payout and stockpiling cash within the rm. In the spirit of Jensen (1986), managers
may divert cash resources away from activities maximizing equity value, resulting in an agency
problem between shareholders and managers.4
Jensen (1986) and Easterbrook (1984) suggest that paying a dividend that is both high
1For evidence on dividend smoothing also see Fama and Babiak (1968), Brav et al. (2005) and Aivazian et al.
(2009).
2In 2006, the sum of all cash and marketable securities represented more than 17% of the sum of all assets for
publicly traded US rms, reecting a substantial increase from 5% in 1990.
3While Harford et al. (2008) provide some empirical evidence consistent with excessive spending of excess cash
for rms with weaker corporate governance, they acknowledge that it is theoretically unclear how a self-interested
manager will choose between paying out, spending, and stockpiling free cash ow.
4Empirical studies such as Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) and Faulkender and Wang (2006) show that $1.00
of retained cash is valued at only $0.42 to $0.88. This is consistent with the agency cost of free cash ow proposed
by Jensen (1986).
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and smooth forces rms to raise external capital to meet their nancing needs. They argue
this exposure to the discipline of capital markets could reduce agency costs. However, as we
show, a manager who perceives a cost to cutting dividends would have an incentive to pile up
excess cash to avoid future reductions in dividends. The joint determination of payout and
cash savings by the manager, and the dynamic eect of requiring smooth dividends which in
turn motivates even larger levels of savings are usually ignored in this remedial view of dividend
smoothing. The empirical investigations on why rms smooth their payout, what type of rms
partake in payout smoothing and what aects the degree of dividend smoothing have led to
conicting and ambiguous results.5 We suggest, these inconclusive empirical ndings could be due
to disregarding the joint determination of variables such as payout ratio, market-to-book ratio,
operating prots, leverage, capital expenditures and cash holdings. A structural estimation, as
we propose, is the most reliable approach to avoid these sorts of endogeneity problems.
We present a structural model which captures the trade-os described earlier and exploit this
model to predict optimal levels of payout and cash holdings for rms which invest in capital, save
cash, raise equity, issue/retire debt, and pay dividends, all under uncertain productivity. Our
dynamic structural model considers the optimal nancial and investment policy for a rm facing
a broad set of frictions: corporate and personal taxation, otation cost for debt, tax penalty for
holding cash, and linear-quadratic costs of external equity.
First, we consider this model under rst-best assumptions where the manager maximizes
the value of equity in the absence of any agency conicts. Parameters of this model are set to
exogenously chosen values. The rst-best solution motivates our later investigation of a set of
second-best policies. Similar to other dynamic structural models which include dividends such as
Hennessy and Whited (2007), our base-case model predicts payouts which are far too volatile to
match the variance of the empirical payout. We propose an agency model to provide an answer
to what motivates corporate payout smoothing. Furthermore, our agency model provides insight
into high levels of cash holdings and low levels of investment volatility. This model considers
a maximization problem faced by a manager who perceives a downward adjustment cost from
cutting payouts when making nancial and real decisions within the rm.
Contrasting our rst-best solution with empirical data shows that managers tend to smooth
rms' payout; the variance of payout in the simulated panel (0.0025) is signicantly larger than
the same ratio in the empirical panel (0.0015). This is consistent with the results of the structural
model from Hennessy and Whited (2007) which overshoots the empirical variance of payout by
a factor of three. The empirical variance of investment-to-assets is approximately half as large
as the simulated moment (0.0069 versus 0.0139). Our rst-best simulated panel also shows that
rms on average maintain signicantly more cash than can be explained through the dynamic
5See Leary and Michaely (2010), Aivazian et al. (2009), Li and Zhao (2008), and Booth and Xu.
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trade-o model alone. The average cash-to-assets ratio from the simulated panel (0.1631) is
four times smaller than the corresponding empirical moment (0.0414). This is consistent with
the empirical literature on cash holdings which argues that rms on average maintain too much
cash.6
To rigorously investigate the motives underlying these deviations from optimality, we use
observed corporate nancing choices to infer the value of a hidden parameter describing the
perceived cost to cutting dividends. Using Simulated Method of Moments (SMM), the value
of this parameter is estimated for the agency model. In particular, in the agency model the
manager's objective function is extended from solely maximizing value of equity by adding a linear
function for the magnitude of the reduction in payout. This allows insight into the magnitude
of the disutility that managers perceive when cutting payouts.
We also estimate other parameters such as the persistence and volatility of the shocks to
cash ow. These two parameters are highly inuential on the precautionary motives for cash
holdings. We also use SMM to estimate the payout tax schedule parameter which pins down
the marginal tax rate of corporate payout. Including these other parameters within the SMM
procedure assures a robust estimation for the agency parameter. Furthermore, we estimate
the parameters for the recapitalization cost of debt and the adjustment cost of capital. These
parameters directly inuence cash holdings, payout, and variance of investments and are therefore
included as unknown parameters in the SMM procedure. We also include parameters which
describe the quadratic equity issuance cost.
The SMM procedure minimizes the distance between simulated and empirical moments which
results in consistent estimates of the unknown parameters. The results of this estimation answer
the following question: What magnitude of managerial perceived costs for cutting payout best
explains observed payout, savings, nancing, and investment patterns?
In our agency model the distortion in the manager's utility function is in the form of a
disutility for reductions of corporate payout. 7 As a consequence of this cost, the manager will
smooth the rm's payout. She will also keep high cash levels to decrease both the probability of
cutting payouts and the magnitude of the required reduction in payout. We acknowledge that this
is only one of many possible ways to model agency conicts between a manager and shareholders
which may lead to excess cash holdings. However, this agency model is primarily motivated
by the discrepancy between the variance of corporate payouts in the simulated base-case panel
versus the empirical panel rather than a desire to explain excess cash holdings. Nevertheless, in
our agency model the low payout variance result can be explained contingent on the diversion
6See Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), Faulkender and Wang (2006), Opler et al. (1999)
7We do not intend to directly explore the sources of this disutility imposed on the manager. However, in later
sections we perform a cross sectional analysis which lends support to several possible explanations for payout
smoothing.
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of resources to cash holdings. We show in our comparative statics exercises, all else being equal,
when managers perceive larger costs to cutting payout, the chosen level of cash holdings would
be higher to prevent a possible shortfall in the next period's dividends. These results further
illustrate the importance of taking into account the joint determination of payout and cash
holdings.
To provide a robust estimation of the model parameters, the SMM moments must be care-
fully selected. In addition to being meaningful descriptors of manager-rm behavior, the mo-
ments must be suciently informative about model parameters. Following Hennessy and Whited
(2007), we also choose moments which are commonly discussed in the empirical literature. Ex-
amples include variance of distributions which is informative about the managerial payout con-
sistency cost parameter and the rst and second moments of the ratio of cash-to-assets which
are informative about both the equity issuance cost and the managerial perceived cost to cutting
payout. Financial ratios such as the rst and second moments of the ratio of equity issuance-to-
assets are also included among the moments. We include leverage ratio, variance of long-term
debt-to-assets and the frequency of long-term debt reductions which are informative about the
debt recapitalization cost parameters. In addition to the above moments, we include the payout
ratio, the frequency of distributions, and the correlation of payout and cash. The nal important
category of moments we include are those which are informative about the rm's cash ow. In
particular, we make use of the second moment of investment and also the serial correlation and
the standard deviation of shocks to income-to-assets.
The empirical sample is constructed from the entire sample of Compustat rms. Our sample
includes non-nancial, unregulated rms from the annual 2006 COMPUSTAT industrial les.8
Our estimation results indicate that the linear payout consistency cost parameter is equal to
0.113 and is statistically signicant at a 5% level. This translates to a typical rm behaving as if
it has a manager who associates an average cost for cutting payout equal to $83,000 for a million
dollars of shareholders' equity value. These SMM parameter estimates support the view that
on average managers 1) anticipate fairly large costs associated with cutting payout, and 2) that
corporations are sensitive to this managerial agency parameter. Our estimates also show a loss
of approximately 7% in equity values due to this agency problem.
Most theories of payout smoothing are motivated either by information asymmetry or agency
explanations. For example, studies such as Almeida et al. (2004) and Bates et al. (2009) argue
that if future dividend cuts are viewed as costly, nancially constrained rms will be reluctant
8We do not include data from 2007-2010 because our model is not intended to capture exogenous shocks
on rm's borrowing costs. The source of uncertainty in our model is only due to income shocks, represented
by a rst-order autoregressive process. A model with structural breaks and shocks on borrowing costs is more
appropriate to explain the observed data in the recent era in the nancial markets. This could be an interesting
extension that is beyond the current scope of the paper.
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to increase dividends even following a positive cash ow shock. Moreover, because smooth
dividends convey more information than erratic dividends, these arguments suggest rms which
suer from greater information asymmetry have a stronger incentive to smooth their dividends.
This prediction is also consistent with signaling explanations such as Kumar (1988), Kumar
and Lee (2001) and Guttman et al. (2001) which argue that semi-separating equilibria in which
rm types pool within a certain range and separate out of that range, could explain dividend
smoothing. These explanations also predict more payout smoothing among rms which have
higher precautionary motives for cash savings.
Agency explanations, such as Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986), suggest that paying
out dividends that are both high and smooth leads to lower agency costs of free cash ow as
self-interested managers are forced to face the discipline of capital markets more often. Other
studies such as Allen et al. (2000) argue that institutional investors who may also lower agency
costs through their monitoring activities, due to their tax status are attracted to rms paying
larger dividends. These institutional investors, in the case of cutting dividends, can impose large
costs on the management. Hence, dividend smoothing is predicted to be more evident among
rms with higher levels of institutional holdings.
Both information asymmetry and agency explanations of payout smoothing assume that
payout smoothing is adopted to improve shareholders value. This may appear to conict with
our estimated perceived cost of cutting payouts and the associated equity loss to the shareholders
from payout smoothing. However, these estimations are done in comparison to the rst-best
results in which no conict exists between the manager and shareholders. Our paper does
not propose to de-emphasize the possible value-enhancing eects of dividend smoothing in the
presence of other possible agency problems.
We explore these predictions and possible heterogeneity in the impact of this managerial
agency problem on payout variance and rm cash holdings by performing estimations on sub-
samples of rms split by a variety of manager-rm characteristics. Through this exercise we nd
some supporting results for each of these payout smoothing explanations.
First, we re-estimate the model using sub-samples obtained by splitting the full sample ac-
cording to the rm size. We nd large dierences between the magnitude of the perceived costs
for the managers of small and large rms. This suggests the full sample parameter estimates
mask heterogeneity across rms and managers. The managerial payout consistency cost parame-
ter is greater for the sample of larger rms. This is consistent with the empirical fact that larger
rms have on average lower payout variance.
The observed average cash-to-assets ratio is higher for smaller rms. At rst glance, it is not
obvious what is driving this result. While we illustrate with sensitivity analysis that the smaller
payout consistency cost parameter leads to smaller cash balances, the eects of higher cash ow
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volatility and larger equity issuance costs outweigh this force and result in larger cash holdings.
The value loss due to the managerial preference for smooth payout is larger (9%) for the sample
of large rms in comparison to the loss for the sample of small rms (1%).
The second sample split is based on information asymmetry measured by analyst forecasts
dispersion. This cross-sectional analysis produces intuitive results. Firms suering from more
information asymmetry in the market tend to have managers with larger preferences for smooth
payouts. Interestingly, this result is masked when the empirical results are looked at in isolation
since the payout variances are similar between the subsamples of high and low information
asymmetry rms.
Consistent with Easterbrook (1984), we nd that rms with managers who are compensated
with high powered incentive packages, proxied by pay-performance-sensitivity (PPS), tend to
have managers who associate lower costs with cutting payouts. Supporting Allen et al. (2000),
rms with larger institutional ownership behave as if they have managers with larger preferences
for smooth payout. Our estimates also result in larger managerial payout consistency costs
for rms which pay larger fractions of their payout in the form of dividends rather than share
repurchases. This is consistent with the empirical literature which suggests that managers do
not smooth repurchases in the same manner as they smooth dividends (e.g. Skinner (2008)).
Finally, by re-estimating our model for the subsample of rm years 2002-2007, we nd that
during recent years the magnitude of the preference for smooth payout has not changed sub-
stantially. A recent empirical study by Bates et al. (2009) argues that the recent increase in US
corporate cash holdings is because the rms' cash ows have become riskier. Supporting this, we
nd that the increase in the volatility of cash ows in recent years can explain the higher level
of cash holdings in the last ve years.
In order to provide intuition regarding the underlying economic forces in the model, we
perform a set of sensitivity analyses through comparative statics. These results show that a
higher managerial payout consistency cost leads to larger cash reserves and also smaller payout
ratios and equity issuances and are inconsistent with the remedial view of payout smoothing
suggested by Jensen (1986) and Easterbrook (1984). From our results it is not clear that imposing
a large cost to cutting payout onto a manager who has to make joint decisions regarding rm's
nancial policies would result in a lower agency cost of free cash ow for the rm. This points
out the signicance of the structural approach in enabling us to account for endogeneity among
corporate policies. It is important to note that the empirical positive association between cash
holdings and payout smoothing documented in Leary and Michaely (2010) could also be due to
the endogenous relationship between these policies. This interpretation diers from the Leary
and Michaely (2010) explanation that cash cows adopt payout smoothing to reduce agency costs.
While Leary and Michaely (2010) nds support only for the agency based explanations of
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payout smoothing, we show information asymmetry could also contribute to this practice. As
in their paper, we also document that payout variance is not related to measures of information
asymmetry. It is only by estimating the unobservable variable of the manager's disutility from
cutting payouts that we are able to bring to light the eect of information asymmetry on the
preference for payout smoothing. Our cross sectional results highlight the importance of struc-
tural estimation for corporate nance studies where endogeneity of certain key variables is a
signicant concern and when model elements are unobservable. With this insight in mind, it is
not surprising that the literature has produced such mixed evidence on the motives for payout
smoothing.
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the related
studies and situate the paper within the existing literature. Section 3 presents the model. In
Section 4, we rst present the results of the base-case model and then describe the results of the
SMM procedure. This section also presents sensitivity analysis and estimation results for various
sample splits. Finally, Section 5 concludes. Explanations of the computational methodology
used in this paper are included in the Appendix.
2 Related Literature
This paper primarily relates to three major areas of corporate nance literature: the structural
literature on dynamic corporate policies as well as the empirical literatures on payout smoothing
and cash holdings.
During the past 50 years empirical studies such as Lintner (1956), Fama and Babiak (1968),
and Choe (1990), have convincingly demonstrated that dividend smoothing is prevalent.9 In a
recent survey study, Brav et al. (2005) report that 94% of managers of dividend paying rms
strongly or very strongly agree that they actively try to avoid reducing dividends. Firms may be
conscious of an implicit bargain with shareholders at the time they invested in equity to provide
a steady stream of payouts. In the presence of information asymmetry in the market, signaling
motives to convey credible information to the investors could also lead to payout smoothing.
It has also been argued that payout smoothing is employed as a remedy to mitigate certain
agency conicts such as the free cash ow problem. All these motives may lead to cross sectional
dierences among rms regarding their payout smoothing behavior.
Leary and Michaely (2010) examines these dierent motivations and nds support for agency
explanations rather than information justications of smoothing behavior.10 They nd that
9For a complete survey on payout policy see DeAngelo et al. (2009).
10See Allen et al. (2000), Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986) for agency explanations. See Kumar (1988),
Brennan and Thakor (1990), and Guttman et al. (2001) for dividend smoothing theories based on asymmetric
information.
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younger, smaller rms, rms with higher earning volatility smooth less. Firms with high cash
holdings, low growth opportunities and higher level of institutional ownership smooth more.
Aivazian et al. (2009) nd that the decision to smooth dividends depends in part on public
market access as proxied by bond ratings. They show that rms smooth more when they raise
debt in the public "uninformed" bond markets rather than in the private informed bank market.
Contrary to Leary and Michaely (2010), they conclude that the dividend smoothing decision is
related to information asymmetry between the managers and the rm's creditors.
Our paper diers from all previous studies as we present the rst dynamic structural model
of payout smoothing. Our structural model does not directly tackle the question of why rms
smooth their payout, instead it focuses on estimating the perceived cost of cutting payout imposed
on the manager. We do contribute to the empirical cross-sectional studies by re-estimating
managerial payout consistency cost for dierent subsamples of the data. We explore dierent
explanations and nd some supporting evidence for both agency and information explanations.
Among structural models of corporate policies, dynamic studies such as Riddick and Whited
(2008) and Gamba and Triantis (2008) investigate the role of cash savings when the rm invests
and saves in the face of costly external equity nance. Gamba and Triantis (2008) presents
a quite general dynamic model, allowing for cash holding as well as separate debt and equity
nance. Like us, they do not include risky debt.11 On the other hand, their model does not
include any source of managerial and debt-related agency problems. Their main contribution is
providing an explanation for how debt otation costs can lead to simultaneous cash and debt
holdings. Riddick and Whited (2008) also investigates why corporations accumulate liquid assets.
They document a negative corporate propensity to save; that is, the rm counteracts movements
in cash ow with opposite movements in savings. Unlike our model, they do not include any
sort of debt (risky or risk-free). They also exclude any agency issues as their focus is not on
shareholder-manager conicts. Neither of these structural models broach the subject of payout
policy.
Our paper is also closely related to Hennessy and Whited (2007), which utilizes a structural
model and SMM to study a rm that invests in the face of costly external equity nancing
and xed costs of capital adjustment. As in our paper, Hennessy and Whited (2007) nds a
suboptimal level of distribution variance indicating managerial preference for payout smoothing.
However, unlike our model which addresses this discrepancy by estimating a payout consistency
cost, Hennessy and Whited (2007) leaves the payout smoothing question unanswered.
Within the crowded dynamic cash literature, a recent study by Moyen and Boileau (2009)
11As elaborated in Appendix D, the exclusion of risky debt from the model makes it more dicult to match
the average cash-to-assets ratio. However, The inclusion of risky debt alone cannot justify the high level of excess
cash.
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presents a model in which precautionary savings can also arise because of rm's liquidity con-
straints. They argue that the capital share of revenues has become smaller over time, thus, the
prudence motive is no longer empirically relevant. In a model with risk-free debt and no agency,
they show that the liquidity constraint motive can by itself explain the observed increase in
cash holdings. While we investigate the role of agency in explaining payout smoothing, we also
illustrate that the agency problem we study could lead to an increase in cash balances.
Besides our paper, there exists only one other structural model which investigates the role of
agency conicts on corporate nance decisions. Nikolov and Whited (2010) estimates a dynamic
model of rm investment and cash accumulation in the presence of shareholder-manager agency
conicts. In their study the source of agency is dierent from ours. They model agency conicts
arising from limited managerial ownership, bonuses based on short term prots, and managerial
empire building preferences. They nd that on average managers like to build empires, and use
too much costly external nancing.
The agency sources studied by Nikolov and Whited (2010) do not relate to the managerial
payout consistency cost which is the focus of our paper. Moreover, they do not distinguish
between debt and equity incorporating both into "external nance". To their credit, Nikolov
and Whited (2010) has the advantage of modeling compensation related agency which we do not
touch on. They also investigate the eect of corporate governance on the magnitude of managers'
empire building preferences. Overall, while the focus of the papers are dierent, our study is
in many ways complementary to Nikolov and Whited (2010), as we capture another source of
agency conicts and its eect on corporate decisions.
Our paper also relates to the empirical literature on how rms allocate their cash ows
between investments, payouts and cash savings. Harford et al. (2008) nds that, in the US, rms
with weaker corporate governance do not payout their excess cash through dividends. Rather,
they choose to distribute excess cash by methods that do not impose any commitment on their
future payouts such as share repurchases. Moreover, these weakly controlled managers actually
save less cash and choose to spend cash quickly on acquisitions and capital expenditures, rather
than hoard it.
Our work is related not only to Harford et al. (2008), but also to a large empirical literature
which shows piling up excess cash and not distributing it to the shareholders can lead to value
decreasing decisions, and that the market value of these cash reserves is lower when rms are
poorly governed and there is weak shareholder protection. This includes studies by Dittmar
and Mahrt-Smith (2003), Harford (1999), Kalcheva and Lins (2007), Pinkowitz et al. (2006) and
Mikkelson and Partch (2003). These papers focus primarily on the eects of excess cash rather
than the motives behind the accumulation of excess cash in the rst place. The only empirical
paper that focuses on possible explanation for the high level of observed excess cash is Bates
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et al. (2009). They show that riskier cash ows in recent years, particularly concentrated among
smaller high tech rms have caused the dramatic growth of excess cash. Although the main focus
of our paper is not excess cash, given that corporate cash and payout policy are intertwined, our
theory allows us to investigate these empirical results more robustly.
3 The Model
3.1 The Base-Case Model
The base-case model represents a rm maximizing its equity value. We construct a discrete-
time, innite-horizon, partial equilibrium, stochastic model of payout, debt, investment and cash
holdings. In our model, rms trade o a tax benet of debt against an adjustment and a otation
cost of debt. Dierent rms are characterized by dierent realizations of the stochastic process.
The rm maximizes equity value by choosing its payout, investment, cash holdings, and debt
policy. All claimants, equity and debt, are risk neutral. The equity value Vt takes the form:
Vt = Dt + T (Dt) + Λ(Dt) +
1
1 + (1− τb)r
Et[Vt+1] (1)
where r is the discount rate, τb is the personal interest income tax rate, and Et is the conditional
expectation at period t. Payouts are represented by the variable Dt.
Dividends and capital gains are taxed according to the tax schedule T (Dt). In this model we
do not directly dierentiate between dividends and share repurchases. However, because share
repurchases are taxed at a lower rate, the tax schedule needs to allow rms to minimize taxes for
smaller payouts by distributing them in the form of share repurchases.12 Following Hennessy and
Whited (2007) and Moyen and Boileau (2009), the payout tax schedule is convex and features
an increasing marginal tax rate:






where φ > 0 is the payout tax parameter, τd is the tax rate, and function 1(Dt>0) equals one if
Dt > 0, and zero otherwise. A larger φ corresponds to a higher marginal tax rate.
In this setup a negative dividend is interpreted as equity issues. Moreover, equity issuance is
associated with a cost. To preserve tractability, we do not model costs of external equity as the
outcome of an asymmetric information problem. Instead, consistent with Riddick and Whited
12Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) concern for stock price manipulation and U.S. Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) regulations to prevent replacement of dividends with systematic share repurchases lead to smaller
payouts being in the form of repurchases while larger distributions are done through tax disadvantaged dividends.
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(2008), we capture adverse selection costs and underwriting fees in a reduced form fashion. The
equity issuance cost is linear-quadratic and weakly convex:






where function 1(Dt<0) equals one if Dt < 0, and zero otherwise. λ0, λ1 and λ2, are positive
constants. Convexity of Λ(Dt) is consistent with the evidence on underwriting fees in Altinkiliç
and Hansen (2000).
Equation (1) shows that the equity value is the sum of the expected discounted stream of
dividends13 net payout tax and equity issuance cost: Dt + T (Dt) + Λ(Dt).
This period's depreciated capital stock and investment form next period's capital stock. The
capital accumulation is thus presented as:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It (4)
Consistent with Riddick and Whited (2008), Moyen and Boileau (2009), and Nikolov and
Whited (2010), the rm purchases and sells capital at a price of one and incurs adjustment costs








where δ is the capital depreciation rate, 0 < δ < 1, Kt is the capital stock and a is the capital
adjustment cost parameter that acts to smooth investment over time.14
The new debt issue is the dierence between the new debt level chosen this period Bt+1 and
the beginning-of-period debt level Bt:
∆Bt+1 = Bt+1 −Bt (6)
The debt is specied with a maturity of one period, but can be viewed as longer term debt with
a oating rate.15 In each period, the rm can roll over its existing debt ∆Bt+1 = 0, retire some
13In this section we refer to any positive payout as dividends. Although, Dt > 0 represents the sum of
repurchases and dividends.
14An alternative is to replace our quadratic capital adjustment cost function with a similar function which also
includes a xed cost to investment:







This functional form inspired by the empirical investment literature (Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006)), has been
used in Riddick and Whited (2008) and Nikolov and Whited (2010). Although the xed component leads to
slightly higher optimal cash levels, it does not change the payout variance. Hence, we focus on the simpler
quadratic cost function.
15We assume there are "perfect" debt covenants restricting the manager from asset sales, dividends, etc.
13
debt ∆Bt+1 < 0, or issue more debt ∆Bt+1 > 0 at the risk free rate.
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(Bt+1 − B̄)2 + q(Bt+1 −Bt)1(Bt+1>Bt) (7)
The rst component, similar to investment, is a quadratic cost to varying the debt level away
from the target debt level B̄ ≥ 0. ω ≥ 0 is the debt adjustment cost parameter. The second
term captures the otation cost on new debt issued. There is no additional cost associated with
paying down debt.17 Parameter q ≥ 0 captures the linear proportional otation cost of new
debt issues. The incremental cost for issuing new debt makes the recapitalization cost of debt
asymmetric.18
In this model, debt nancing has a tax advantage as the interest is deductible by the rm at a
higher rate than the interest income is taxable to individuals (τc > τb). Hence, the recapitalization
cost of debt plays an important role by providing an implicit upper bound on the debt level.19
The rm's sources-and-uses of funds equation denes the payout:
Dt = (1− τc)f(Kt; θt) + τcδKt − It + ∆Bt+1 − (1− τc)rBt − A(Kt, Kt+1)
−Ω(Bt+1, Bt) + (1 + (1− τc)r)Ct − Ct+1 (8)
where τc is the rm's tax rate, Kt is the capital stock, θt describes the rm's underlying income
shock, (1− τc)f(Kt; θt) is the after tax operating income before depreciation, τcδKt is the depre-
ciation tax shield, It is the investment, ∆Bt+1 is the new debt issue, r is the risk free rate, Bt is
the debt level and (1− τc)rBt is the after-tax interest payment. The depreciation rate used for
tax purposes is assumed to be equal to the true economic depreciation rate of the capital stock.
The stock of cash has to be non-negative as we do not model lines of credit separately from debt
issuance.
Ct+1 ≥ 0 (9)
16The risk free-debt structure abstracts from any possible agency problem associated with the rm increasing
its leverage to expropriate wealth from existing creditors. For a model which focuses on these agency problems
see Moyen (2007).
17In the Appendix we replace the current simplied risk-free debt structure with a more elaborated risky debt
in which the requested interest rate by the creditors becomes an endogenous variable changing with how far the
rm is from default. Here, we settle for the simpler debt structure as 1) our focus of the paper is not rm capital
structure, 2) the risky debt model presents signicant computational challenges resulting in problems for the
SMM procedure. Nevertheless, in the appendix we show that the base-case model with risky debt does not lead
to a dramatic dierence in the payout ratio and variance.
18The asymmetric recapitalization cost for debt is consistent with Gamba and Triantis (2008). Moyen and
Boileau (2009) also shows that introduction of asymmetric recapitalization cost enhances the precautionary motive
for cash holdings.
19We do not include a collateral constraint as it does not change our main results. Moreover, both the recapi-
talization cost of debt and a collateral constraint play a similar role by providing a ceiling on debt.
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The rm's operating income before depreciation is presented as:
f(Kt; θt) = θtK
α
t (10)
Operating income before depreciation exhibits decreasing returns to scale when 0 < α < 1.
The rm's income shock is represented by a rst-order autoregressive process with persistence ρ
and volatility σ:
ln θt+1 = ρ ln θt + σεt+1 (11)
where εt ∼ N(0, 1). Because the persistence parameter ρ is not zero, the income shock is
somewhat predictable. The rm anticipates the income shock it will face next period and chooses
its investment, debt policy and cash holdings accordingly. The rm cannot perfectly foresee the
income shock it will face next period.
In this model, the manager maximizes the equity value of the rm such that equations (2)-
(11) are satised.20 This forms the base-case model where the manager acts in the interest of
all equity holders. She does not extract any sort of private benets which may cause an agency
conict between herself and the shareholders. In the following section we will extend the model
to allow the manager to perceive a cost to cutting payouts.
In the base-case model the manager's choice of payout is similar to a residual payout policy in
which the positive residual after choosing the new cash level, debt level, and rm's investment,
is payed out to the shareholders. The manager selects optimal levels of payout only through her
other decisions.
In a model with no cost of raising equity, there would be no need for stocks of cash. That is,
if Λ(Dt) = 0 then the rm can eectively manage its nancing by buying and selling its capital
stock and changing its nancial structure. However, due to costly equity issues Λ(Dt), the rm
may save some cash to reduce expected future nancing costs. The rm's optimal level of cash
holdings also depends on the rm's expected future nancing needs which in turn depend on the
rm's production function f(Kt; θt) and especially on the uncertainty it faces through the shock
θt. The optimal cash holdings also relate to the rm's holdings of debt and the recapitalization
cost of debt. If debt adjustments were not costly, the rm could simultaneously meet its nancing
needs and avoid costly equity issues by raising more debt. By including the recapitalization cost
of debt hand in hand with the cost of issuing equity, we are able to address the simultaneous
existence of debt, equity issues and cash balances in the rm.
In summary, our dynamic model describes a rm which at each period chooses how much
dividend Dt to pay, how much to invest It, how much debt to issue ∆Bt+1 and how much cash to
keep Ct+1. Constrained by equations (2)-(11) , the rm makes these choices in order to maximize
20This could be justied by simply assuming that the manager owns a proportion of rm's equity.
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the equity value in Equation (1). The rm makes these decisions after observing the beginning-
of-the-period value for the income shock θt and last period's choices of capital stock Kt, debt Bt,





Dt + T (Dt) + Λ(Dt) +
1




subject to Equations (2)-(11).
The model cannot be solved analytically. The solution is approximated using numerical
methods. Once decision rules are obtained, a panel of rms is simulated and studied. The
employed numerical method is discussed in the Appendix. However, to develop some intuition
behind the optimal policy we consider the Euler equation relating the model's dynamics to
changes in cash. Utilizing the envelope condition, this Euler equation can be presented as
follows:
1 + (λ1 − λ2Dt)1(Dt<0) + (−τd + τd exp(−φDt))1(Dt>0) =
=
1 + (1− τc)r
1 + (1− τb)r
Et[1 + (λ1 − λ2Dt+1)1(Dt+1<0) + (−τd + τd exp(−φDt+1))1(Dt+1>0)] (13)
The optimal interior nancial policy has to satisfy this condition. The right hand side rep-
resents the shadow value of cash balances, and the left hand side represents the marginal cost
of external equity nance plus the marginal cost of the tax schedule on corporate dividends. If
a rm saves a dollar today, it reduces the probability of having to issue new equity tomorrow.
It also inuences both the probability of future payout and the marginal cost of the payout tax
in the next period. The rm continues to save just to the point where the gain from reducing
future equity costs outweighs the tax penalty on savings.
Inspection of Equation 13 also reveals that optimal cash, investment and debt policies are
clearly intertwined. In the base-case model the nancing trade-os are somewhat similar to the
trade-os in Riddick and Whited (2008). Although our base-case model also incorporates risk-
free debt and tax on dividends, the fundamental trade-o is between the tax disadvantage of
holding cash versus the nancial exibility provided by cash allowing the rm to avoid the cost
of external equity and the recapitalization cost of debt.21
21The base-case model with risky debt, elaborated in the Appendix, adds to this trade-o which makes cash
marginally more valuable resulting in higher optimal cash holdings.
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3.2 The Agency Model
In this section we present an agency model where the objective function of the manager is
modied to capture a possible perceived cost faced when dividends are cut. The maintenance
of consistent dividends is a widespread practice generally taken as an article of faith. We also
take this for granted as an empirical fact and focus on the estimation of the loss due to the
prevalence of payout smoothing. The perceived cost of payout smoothing is present in the form
of an attenuation of the manager's utility function that is linear in the magnitude of the payout
reduction.22 The Bellman equation describing the manager's intertemporal problem is




Dt + Λ(Dt) + T (DT ) +
1
1 + (1− τb)r




subject to Equations (2)-(11).
The constraints of the maximization problem remain unchanged from the base-case model.
The magnitude of the disutility function is captured by parameter γ. To our knowledge this
model is the rst study which estimates the perceived cost managers associate with cutting
dividends.
By construction, it is clear that the agency model will lead to a lower payout variance.
However, further investigation is required to determine whether, in comparison to the base-case
results, incorporating this disutility results in higher levels of cash holding. Studies such as
Easterbrook (1984), and Jensen (1986) suggest that dividend smoothing could be employed to
make managers less exible and more reliant on external capital markets. They argue that this
practice would make the managers pay out excess cash and face capital markets more often. In
our agency model the manager is aware of possible costs she will face if the rm's dividends are
cut.23
The perceived cost of dividend smoothing would aect both the marginal cost of keeping cash
22This is one of the many possible approaches to model managerial preference for smooth payout. We chose
this special type of disutility after observing the suboptimal level of payout variance (relative to the base-case
results) in the empirical sample.
23We abstract from distinguishing among dierent types of disutility the manager may experience in the case of
cutting dividends since the main focus of the paper is to estimate the "magnitude" of the cost and the consequent
loss in equity value. The cost could arise from pressure from institutional investors requesting dividends as
suggested by Allen et al. (2000) or not being able to convey credible information to the market (a particular
problem for rms which suer from higher level of information asymmetry suggested by Kumar (1988), Kumar
and Lee (2001) and Guttman et al. (2001)).
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and the shadow value of cash balances. Keeping more cash today also decreases the probability of
having to cut dividends tomorrow. Conditional on cutting dividends, higher cash levels decrease
the magnitude of this reduction and consequently the manager's disutility. The earlier empirical
studies usually do not account for this co-determination of cash holdings and payout. While
payout smoothing could be imposed by shareholders (e.g. institutional investors) with the goal
of increasing payout and reducing agency conicts, it could lead to an increase in excess cash
and further deviation from rst-best corporate policies.24 In this model, we test for this eect by
employing SMM to endogenously solve for the unknown parameters. Furthermore, we allow the
persistence and volatility of the cash ow shocks (ρ, σ) and also the quadratic equity issuance cost
parameters, the debt recapitalization cost parameters, the distribution tax schedule parameter,
and the capital adjustment cost parameter (λ0, λ1, λ2, ω, q, B̄, φ, a) to be endogenously estimated
alongside the agency parameter.
4 Estimated Optimal Corporate Policies
4.1 The Calibration
Acquiring a solution to our base-case model, details of which are explained in the Appendix,
requires values for the full set of parameters: r, δ, τc, τb, τd, ω, q, B̄, α, φ, ρ, σ, λ0 , λ1 , λ2.
As in Riddick and Whited (2008), we set the parameters of the equity issues cost function from
the estimations of Hennessy and Whited (2007): λ0 = 0.389, λ1 = 0.053, λ2 = 0.0002. These
values are their estimates of the cost of equity issues for large rms. These are conservative
estimates which are just slightly above the estimates for underwriting costs in Altinkiliç and
Hansen (2000).
Following recent dynamic investment studies, we set the real interest rate r to 0.02. This
lies between the values chosen by Moyen and Boileau (2009) and Riddick and Whited (2008).25
The depreciation rate δ is set to 0.10. The tax rates are set to reect the US corporate and
personal tax rates of 35% and 25%: τc = 0.35 and τb = 0.25. The marginal dividend tax rate is
set to τd = 0.25, approximately the value of 0.2325 calculated by Moyen and Boileau (2009) for
the time period 1995-2006. We also set the distribution tax parameter φ to 0.45. Later, we will
endogenously estimate this parameter when solving the agency model. For the adjustment cost
parameter we turn to Nikolov and Whited (2010) which estimate a = 0.2471.
24We do not intend to ignore the possible upsides of payout smoothing since in the presence of additional
agency conicts, we can not predict what would have been the alternative policy in the absence of smoothing.
However, in comparison to the rst-best results, payout smoothing would always lead to an equity value loss for
the shareholders.
25Moyen and Boileau (2009) uses the average of the monthly annualized t-bill rate deated by the consumer
price index to determine the risk free rate: r = 1.6091%.
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Following Gamba and Triantis (2008), the serial correlation of shock ρ is set at 0.62. Similar
to Moyen (2004), the standard deviation of the shock σ is set at 0.20. These values are between
Hennessy and Whited (2007) and Nikolov and Whited (2010), which respectively estimate the
persistence to 0.56 and 0.67, and the standard deviation of the shock to 0.11 and 0.31. When
solving the agency model we estimate these two parameters endogenously.
Similar to Gamba and Triantis (2008), the otation cost of new debt issues is set to q = 0.02.
The adjustment cost of debt ω and the constant debt level B̄ are set to 0.02 and 14, respectively.26
Furthermore, following Moyen (2004) and Gamba and Triantis (2008) we set the production
return-to-scale parameter α at 0.45.
Given these parameter values, the base-case is solved numerically as described in the Ap-
pendix. The resulting series Kt+1, ∆Bt+1, Dt, Ct+1 and Vt are simulated from random outcomes
of the income shock θt. A sample of 20,000 rms is generated, where each series in the panel
denes a rm.27 Dropping the rst part of the series (the rst 20 periods) allows us to observe
the rm after it has worked its way out of a possibly suboptimal starting point.
In the agency model, we estimate unknown parameters using SMM. This procedure chooses
the payout consistency cost parameter, the volatility and persistence of the cash ow shocks,
equity issuance cost parameters, debt recapitalization cost parameters, the capital adjustment
cost parameter and the distribution tax schedule parameter to minimize the distance between
model-generated moments and the corresponding moments from actual data. Because the mo-
ments of the model-generated data depend on the structural parameters utilized, minimizing this
distance will provide consistent estimates under the conditions discussed in Appendix B.
4.2 Matching Moments
The twinned goals of the SMM procedure are to rst, generate a model which provides a useful
and accurate predictor of the behavior of the sampled rms and to second, provide meaningful
estimates of the underlying parameters. The moments selected for matching within the SMM
procedure form the bridge in this mapping between the empirical data and structural model. To
convincingly achieve the above goals these moments must be selected in a principled manner.
The rst goal requires that the empirical moments are commonly employed in nance practice;
if the moments are not interesting then the predicted behavior will be of little value. Towards
this goal, we select moments which are used in the literature and provide a broad picture of the
structure and dynamics of the rms nancing and productivity. We also select moments which
26To put the value of B̄ in perspective, we also calculate the ratio of B̄ to capital K. In our base-case model,
this ratio is roughly equal to 0.30.
27Michaelides and Ng (2000) states that a simulated sample of about 10 times the size of the actual data is
required in order to produce reliable estimates from an indirect inference estimator. This is chosen simply because
we intend to employ SMM on the agency model in the next section.
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provide a focused picture of payout policy since these decisions are of particular interest to this
study. To be convinced that the second goal was achieved one requires that other parameter
settings cannot explain the empirical moments. To correctly identify the parameter values we
ensure that there are a sucient number of moments informative about each parameter. These
requirements of selecting meaningful and informative moments in large part echo the selection
procedures employed in other SMM estimates such as Hennessy and Whited (2007) and Nikolov
and Whited (2010). We now proceed to discuss how the selected moments provide a meaningful
picture of the sampled rms.
We attempt to match the rst and second moments of the ratio of cash holdings-to-assets,
the payout ratio, the payout variance, the frequency of positive payout, the rst and second
moments of equity issuance-to-assets, the variance of investment-to-assets ratio, the average of
debt-to-assets ratio, the second moment of long-term debt-to-assets ratio, frequency of long-term
debt reduction, the covariance of cash and payout, and nally the ratios of the standard deviation
of the shocks to income-to-assets and the serial correlation of income-to-assets. These moments
are used to estimate parameters (γ, λ0, λ1, λ2, a, σ, ρ, ω, B̄, φ).
The payout ratio, the variance of payout and the frequency of positive payout are all informa-
tive about the payout tax schedule φ. More importantly, these three moments help us to identify
the agency parameter γ. The perceived cost to cutting payout clearly aects the variance of the
payout. This cost also inuences the level of payout as the manager keeps in mind possibility of
costly future reductions in payout when choosing the level of payout. The frequency of paying
out is aected by both γ and φ making it a good candidate for the SMM. The magnitude of the
perceived cost to cutting dividends also inuences corporate cash holdings. Thus, the mean and
variance of cash-to-assets is also informative about the managerial payout consistency costs.
The rst and second moments of equity issuance are informative about the costs of issuing
equity. Hence, they are directly informative about the equity issuance cost parameters λ0, λ1,
λ2. Costly equity issuance is part of the trade o model and is one of the reasons rms keep cash
balances. Therefore, the rst and second moments of cash-to-assets are also informative about
these parameters.
The correlation between payout and cash holdings provides information about the trade-
o between paying out and piling up cash, which is inuenced by the payout consistency cost
parameter γ. This correlation sheds light on how rms smooth their payout. In good times
rms could take advantage of their higher cash ows to accumulate cash or to distribute to their
shareholders.
The variance of investment-to-assets ratio is directly aected by the capital adjustment cost
parameter a. It is also clear that, through the trade-o in the use of funds, this moment is indi-
rectly informative regarding the payout consistency cost parameter. A manager who associates
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a disutility to uctuations in corporate payout will maintain cash as a cushion to avoid volatile
distributions. This leads to more consistent and more frequent investments of smaller sizes.28
For the constant level of debt B̄ and the debt recapitalization cost parameters ω and q, we
target three moments of the debt policy. The average debt-to-assets ratio is informative about B̄.
This is also informative about the position of debt in the nancing hierarchy, which also depends
on the parameters of the equity issuance cost function. Our estimate of ω and q ensures that the
simulated variance of leverage matches the actual data.29 The parameters of the recapitalization
cost of debt also aect the level of equity issues and cash holdings. As debt recapitalization
becomes more costly, equity issues become more attractive to the rm. Cash reserves, as internal
nancing resources, are another alternative to avoid the cost of issuing equity. Cash holdings are
thus also inuenced by changes in debt recapitalization cost parameters. Hence, the means of
equity issues-to-assets and cash-to-assets are both indirectly informative about ω and q. We also
include the frequency of long-term debt reduction as another moment in the SMM. This helps
us to identify between the symmetric versus the asymmetric recapitalization cost parameters (ω
versus q).
The last set of moments we consider are informative about the production side of the rm.
The autoregressive parameter, ρ and the standard deviation, σ, decribe the stochastic process
inuencing the production function. To identify these parameters we follow the methodology
outlined in Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) by estimating a rst-order panel autoregression of operating
income on lagged operating income. The resulting autoregressive parameter and the standard
deviation of the regression residual are directly informative about ρ and σ. In the absence of
payout smoothing, when managers follow a residual dividend policy, more volatile income leads
to a higher payout variance. Therefore, these moments will also be aected by the managerial
payout consistency cost parameter. They also inuence the precautionary motive of cash, as
higher volatility of shocks and higher persistence of shocks would lead to higher optimal levels
of cash holdings.
4.3 Simulation and Estimation Results
To mimic the real-world empirical variables, we dene the following variables from the simulated
panel.
28We do not match the mean of investment-to-assets ratio since this moment only responds to the depreciation
rate δ and is not a great choice for identifying any other parameter. We do not endogenously estimate the
depreciation rate and set it to 10%.
29The recapitalization costs are more relevant to long-term debt than to short-term debt, thus we focus on the
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Appendix C describes the data and sample selection procedure. Simulation results for the
full sample are presented in Table 1. This table compares the actual moments with those from
the simulated model using exogenously selected parameter values. The largest inconsistency
between the simulated and empirical moments is the over-estimation of the payout variance by
roughly a factor of two. We also highlight that the structural model predicts a lower average
cash-to-assets ratio. These results support the empirical literature arguing that 1) managers
tend to smooth corporate payout, and 2) the high level of cash holdings observed in the data
cannot be explained by a trade-o model. The variance of cash-to-assets and the variance of
investment-to-assets ratios are also higher than their respective empirical moments.
Since Lintner (1956), there has been a stream of convincing results supporting the tendency of
corporations to smooth dividends. To justify this practice, an extensive literature has developed
which argues that managers commit to consistent and high payouts to impose self-discipline.
However, the empirical work in this area is not compelling. This view features a manager who,
during good times, prefers to spend cash on value-destroying expansions of their rms resulting
in over-investment and acquisitions (Jensen and Meckling (1976), Moeller et al. (2005), and
Harford et al. (2008)) rather than paying out the excess free cash ow. Hence, it has been
argued that imposing a high and smooth payout could result in less agency loss due to other
inecacies such as over-investment or excess cash-piling. If rst-best policies were achievable,
any disutility imposed to the manager would lead to suboptimal policies and equity value relative
to the rst-best. Our results in Table 1 show that these managers tend to smooth their payouts
more than what is required to maximize the equity value of the rm.
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Similar to Hennessy and Whited (2007), our estimated second moment of payout is signi-
cantly larger than the empirical moment. The observed inconsistency in payout variance reported
in Table 1 is consistent with the dividend smoothing puzzle. The second moment of investment-
to-assets ratio is also larger than its empirical moment. This could be due to higher capital
adjustment costs. However, this moment could also be aected by manager's payout smooth-
ing behavior. This motivates a more rigorous analysis in which we can estimate various model
parameters simultaneously, to ensure similar simulated and empirical moments.
The exogenously chosen parameters also lead to overestimation of the payout ratio and the
average debt-to-assets ratio. Furthermore, the correlation between corporate payout and cash
holdings is smaller in the empirical panel. These results, hand in hand with the low estimate
of the rst moment of the cash-to-assets ratio, suggest the existence of some external agency
parameters inuencing the objective function of the rm's manager. When viewed in concert
with the overestimation of the payout variance, this evidence suggests that this agency conict
may be due to the cost managers associate with cutting payout.
The standard deviation of the shocks to income-to-assets and the serial correlation of the
shocks to income-to-assets from the simulated panel are lower than the same moments from the
empirical panel (0.5751 and 0.1317 versus 0.6091 and 0.1483, respectively). This suggests the
possibility of inappropriate choices of exogenous parameter values for ρ and σ. Therefore, when
we employ SMM to estimate the agency parameter of the second-best (agency) model, we include
the persistence and volatility of the cash ow shocks within the set of model parameters which
are endogenously estimated.
[ Insert Table 1 Here ]
We now present estimation results for the SMM estimation for the full sample of rm-years.
Table 2 compares the actual moments with those from the simulated agency model. Overall,
the rst panel's results indicate small dierences between the simulated moments and the em-
pirical moments. The payout variance is matched closely to its empirical counterpart as are the
payout ratio and frequency of paying out. The mean of the cash-to-assets ratio is still slightly
underestimated but has been increased by a factor of three in comparison to the results of the
base-case model.30 The rst moment of the equity-to-assets ratio is decreased to slightly below
its empirical moment likely due to the increase in the estimated equity issuance cost parameters
over the exogenously chosen values for these parameters. Overall, this result suggests that the
30There has been a concern with the high level of positive skewness of cash holdings as some rms maintain
enormous level of cash causing a long right tail. When comparing the skewness of cash-to-assets of the empirical
panel (1.4762) with the simulated panel (1.4543) we nd minimal dierence. Therefore, we do not include the
third moment of cash-to-assets as a moment in the SMM.
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agency model in which the manager associates a disutility with cutting dividends, has largely
succeeded in matching the simulated moments with the empirical moments.
The second panel of Table 2 contains the estimated model parameters. Estimated persistence
(ρ) and volatility of the cash ow shocks (σ) for the full sample are 0.681 and 0.246, and are
both statistically signicant at the 10% level. The estimates of the debt recapitalization cost
parameters (q, ω) and the capital adjustment cost parameter (a) are all statistically signicant
at the 10% level. The estimated average debt (B̄) is statistically signicant at 1% since it has a
direct one to one relationship with the average leverage ratio. The payout tax schedule parameter
(φ) is estimated to be 0.318 and is statistically signicant at 10%. This estimate is substantially
less than the distribution tax schedule parameter found in Hennessy and Whited (2007). We
conjecture that this result comes from our inclusion of the perceived cost of payout reduction. In
the absence of this agency factor, payout variance is primarily inuenced by the distribution tax
parameter φ and so, to attempt to match the payout variance with its low empirical value, this tax
parameter has to be very large. This is illustrated in the sensitivity analysis section, where larger
values of φ result in smaller payout variances. Firms try to avoid a large convex tax on payouts,
thus they choose to smooth their payouts. However, this motive for payout smoothing alone is
not enough to explain the substantially lower payout variance found within the data. Models
which do not include managerial disutility for payout reduction, such as Hennessy and Whited
(2007), are unable to match the second moment of the distributions precisely. Nevertheless, in
an attempt to match this moment with its empirical value, they estimate a large value for φ.
The estimated parameters also decrease the correlation between cash holdings and corporate
payout, matching it to its empirical value. Without a cost to payout reductions, both cash
accumulation and payout are closely correlated with production. During good days, rms utilize
the higher cash ows to accumulate cash and distribute dividends to their shareholders. However,
in the agency model, as illustrated below, the perceived cost to cutting payout results in a smaller
payout ratio and larger cash balances. This second force acts on the correlation between cash
holdings and payout in the opposite direction of the rst force, thereby decreasing the large
positive correlation to a smaller though still positive correlation.
The equity issuance cost parameters are larger than the exogenously chosen levels indicating
higher frictions associated with issuing new equity. While the convex cost parameter λ2 is
statistically insignicant, λ0 and λ1 are statistically signicant at 5% and 10%, respectively.
The managerial payout consistency parameter γ is also statistically signicant at the 5%
level. The estimated coecient γ is equal to 0.113 which indicates that managers who cut their
payout, on average perceive a cost roughly equal to 11% of the magnitude of payout reduction.
We discuss the value loss implications for shareholders in detail in later sections. To consider
these estimates from an economic perspective, we also calculate the ratio of managerial disutility
24
to equity value. The results illustrate that, on average, for every million dollars of shareholders'
equity value, managers associate a cost equivalent to $80,000 for payout reductions.
[ Insert Table 2 Here ]
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis
We perform a set of sensitivity analyses to gain a better understanding of the informativeness of
the selected moments about model parameters. In particular, we are interested in how the agency
parameter aects payout, nancing, and corporate savings. Figure 1 presents the results of the
comparative statics exercises. These results focus on the two parameters which most directly
aect corporate payout policy: γ and φ. Using the estimated parameter values from Table 2, we
solve the model 15 times while incrementing the changing parameter.
First, we examine the sensitivity of the payout moments (the payout variance, payout ratio,
and the frequency of paying out), and a set of important nancial and real moments (the average
cash-to-assets ratio, the average equity issues-to-assets ratio, variance of investments-to-assets,
and the standard deviation of shocks to income-to-assets) to the key agency parameter: the
payout consistency cost parameter γ. We allow γ to change from 0 to 0.5. The rst seven panels
in Figure 1 illustrate the comparative statics for each chosen moment when changing γ.
The rst comparative static illustrates that the payout variance decreases as the managerial
consistency cost parameter increases. Although the cost of cutting payout is linear in the size
of the payout reduction, the corresponding drop in payout variance is non-linear. The payout
variance drops sharply as γ increases since by construction of the agency model, the manager
chooses to maintain a less volatile payout as she associates higher costs to cutting payouts. With
larger values of γ, the perceived cost of cutting payout becomes large relative to the equity value
which results in the manager choosing an almost constant payout policy. This is illustrated by
the payout variance approaching zero when γ > 0.20.
The second panel of Figure 1, illustrates that the payout ratio decreases monotonically with
γ. This is particularly interesting because it shows that a manager who associates large costs to
cutting payout will maintain a lower level of payout. On better days, a manager who foresees
a cost from reducing future payouts will choose smaller payout increases. When the manager
faces a high realization of cash ow shocks, she would rather pay back debt and pile up cash
than increase the payout since she takes into account the probability of a reduction in the future
payout. This cautious payout policy leads to a lower payout ratio. Unlike the suggestions of
Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986), a manager who takes into account the future disutility
associated with cutting payout, would maintain a lower payout ratio. Therefore, shareholders
25
imposing a higher cost onto the manager will result in more consistent payout while decreasing
the level of payout.
The third panel shows the response of the frequency of paying out to changes in γ. Inter-
estingly, the payout consistency cost parameter has little eect on the payout frequency. We
believe that there are two counteracting forces acting on the payout frequency. In our agency
model, a manager who has already committed to a positive payout and receives a low cash ow
realization would not fully abandon the payout. This is dierent from the rst-best results where
a manager may fully avoid paying out when low shocks are realized. This force would lead to
an increase in payout frequency as γ increases. On the other hand, a manager who currently
has zero payout and experiences an intermediate or low cash ow shock would not initiate a
payout. Due to the persistence of cash ow shocks, the manager would foresee future payout
cuts and avoid this expected future disutility. This eect works in the opposite direction of the
rst force. It appears that on average, these two eects cancel each other out leading to the
payout frequency remaining unchanged in response to changes in γ.
The cash-to-assets ratio increases with γ since the manager has an additional motive for saving
(Panel 4, Figure 1). She saves more cash to use as a cushion against future low realizations of
cash ow, allowing her to maintain a more consistent payout. However, the cash-to-assets ratio
increases very slowly. An extremely large value of γ = 0.5 would only increase the cash-to-assets
by 18% to 0.17. This suggests that the signicantly higher empirical cash holdings (the excess
cash puzzle) are not primarily driven by this type of agency conict.
In our structural model, the rm is also able to issue new equity which is mutually exclusive
to paying out. The larger payout consistency cost indirectly leads to a smaller equity issues-to-
assets ratio (Panel 5, Figure 1). As γ increases the rm becomes more cautious and less volatile
in its payout, cash and investment policies. Therefore, the rm relies more on its internal means
of nancing resulting in smaller costly equity issuances. The reduction in the equity issues-to-
assets ratio is due to a lower magnitude of equity proceeds conditional on issuing equity rather
than facing the capital markets less frequently.
Panel 6 of Figure 1 shows that the variance of investments decreases with γ. Structural
models such as Hennessy and Whited (2007) overshoot the variance of investments. Hennessy and
Whited (2007) argues that incorporating irreversibility into the investment cost function could
help to explain the high level of investment variance. We, however, rationalize the investment
variance produced by these models through a managerial preference for payout smoothing. A
manager who smooths payout will invest in smaller sizes but more often, leading to a lower
variance of investment though the average investment is unchanged. In this manner, a preference
for consistent payout leads to a less volatile investment policy.
In Panel 7, we illustrate the relationship between the standard deviation of shocks to income-
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to-assets and the managerial payout consistency cost parameter γ. A smoother investment policy,
resulting from the preference for consistent payout, leads to a less volatile income-to-assets ratio.
Overall, these panels help us understand how dierent nancing and payout moments respond
to changes in γ. These moments are also all endogenously related to each other through their
relationship with the managerial preference for consistent payout. The larger cash balances, the
lower payout ratio and the smaller equity issuances associated with larger values of γ do not
support the remedial view of payout smoothing.
In the next three panels we investigate the relationship between the three payout moments
with another important model parameter: the payout tax schedule parameter φ. Both φ and γ
intensify payout smoothing behavior. However, φ diers from γ in that rather than penalizing
reductions in payout, φ simply penalizes large payout.
Panel 8 shows that the payout variance decreases as the payout tax schedule parameter in-
creases. The payout tax parameter is positively related to the marginal tax rate on corporate
payout. As the payout tax parameter increases, due to the convexity of the tax schedule, a man-
ager who cares about the smoothness of the rm's payout avoids large and infrequent dividends
by choosing a payout policy which includes distributions that are smaller in magnitude and are
paid out more often. This eect results in a less volatile payout. However, as shown in Panel 9,
the average payout ratio is not signicantly aected by the tax schedule parameter φ. Panel 10
sheds more light on the relationship between the payout policy and the payout tax schedule pa-
rameter. The last panel shows that as φ increases the rm pays out more often. A more frequent
payout which is smaller in magnitude leads to a similar payout ratio to a policy featuring large
and infrequent distributions. These three panels together illustrate that the payout tax schedule
parameter φ also inuences the payout moments of the model.
[ Insert Figure 1 Here ]
4.5 Sample Splits and Cross-Sectional Variations
We now examine the role of the payout consistency cost in corporate policies by estimating our
dynamic structural model on subsamples that have been split based on dierent corporate and
managerial measures. This helps us to both explore possible heterogeneity in perceived costs of
payout reduction across rms and shed light on the motives underlying payout smoothing. For
each variable of interest we split the full sample into four quartiles. We report only estimates for
the highest and lowest quartile subsamples.31
31Because our sample split variables are at best rough proxies for the true underlying constructs, we choose to
focus on using only the high and low quartiles. This will reduce the possibility that a rm in placed in the wrong
subsample.
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First, we divide the sample by rm size measured by book assets. Size provides a proxy
for several underlying characteristics of the rm which may provide dierent motives for payout
smoothing. Investigating the dierences in the estimated agency parameter between the largest
and smallest quartiles of the rms, sheds light on the existing heterogeneity of managerial pref-
erences.
Firm size is highly correlated with rm age. Larger and older rms usually have better and
cheaper access to credit markets. As in Almeida et al. (2004), it has been argued that payout
smoothing can arise from an eort to avoid costly external nance. This would lead one to
expect more payout smoothing among smaller rms which have less access to external nancing.
On the other hand, larger and older rms are more prone to have high levels of free cash ow.
For example, Leary and Michaely (2010), and DeAngelo et al. (2009) nd a positive relationship
between smoothing and the severity of the free cash ow problem. The eect of access to capital
and free cash ow move in opposite directions.
Firm size could also proxy for information asymmetry and cash ow uncertainty. Arguably,
small rms suer from more information asymmetry in the market and may also be subject to
dierent real shocks compared to large mature rms. The empirical volatility of the shocks to
income-to-assets are signicantly greater for smaller rms. Generally speaking, the asymmet-
ric information explanations of payout smoothing suggest that rms facing more uncertainty
and greater information asymmetry will tend to smooth more (see for example, Kumar (1988),
Brennan and Thakor (1990), Guttman et al. (2001)). This uncertainty also aects corporate
cash policy. Smaller rms would need a higher level of cash balances as a precautionary device
for possible shortfalls in future cash ow. While in our sensitivity analysis we noted a positive
endogenous relationship between cash and payout consistency cost, it is not obvious that this
drives the observed higher average cash-to-assets ratio for the smaller rms. For all these reasons,
we begin by dividing the sample according to rm size to examine the dierences between the
estimated parameters across rms.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 report parameter estimates for large and small rms, respectively.
Our results indicate a positive association between rm size and managerial payout consistency
cost as managers of smaller rms tend to associate less cost to cutting their payouts. The
estimated coecient γ is equal to 0.066 for the small rms which is signicantly smaller than the
coecient of 0.138 estimated for the large rms. The smaller magnitude of the payout consistency
cost among smaller rms indicates that the higher level of cash holdings among these rms is
not due to this agency problem. Rather, it can be attributed to the signicantly higher standard
deviation of shocks to income (0.281 versus 0.133) and larger equity issuance costs. The quadratic
equity issuance cost parameter, the debt recapitalization cost parameter and the persistence of
the shocks to income-to-assets are not statistically signicant for the subsample of small rms.
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However, for the large rms subsample, all of the parameters are statistically signicant at the
10% level. In general, the behavior of larger rms seems to be more closely aligned with the
simulated results. This may follow from larger rms following policies that are more similar in
nature to those resulting from a dynamic trade-o model such as ours.
[ Insert Table 3 Here ]
As we just described, rm size could proxy for dierent rm and managerial characteristics.
These results could still mask substantial heterogeneity across rms. In the following splits we
select other proxies which attempt to measure relevant rm and managerial characteristics more
directly.
We use dispersion of analyst forecasts to measure the degree of information asymmetry be-
tween managers and investors. Larger forecast dispersion indicates a poorer information envi-
ronment. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 contain the results for subsamples of high and low analyst
forecasts dispersion. The estimated payout consistency parameter is larger for the subsample of
high analysts forecasts dispersion (0.126 versus 0.091). This result suggests that managers of
rms facing higher levels of information asymmetry perceive larger disutilities from reductions
in their payouts. It is interesting to note that the variance of corporate payout does not dier
signicantly between the two subsamples (0.0017 versus 0.0019). Compared to rms with low
analyst forecasts dispersion, rms with high analyst forecasts dispersion experience much higher
standard deviation of the shocks to income. The higher volatility of income implies that these
rms naturally have higher variance of payouts. The larger estimated managerial payout con-
sistency cost makes the otherwise very large payout variance smaller, thereby leaving the two
subsamples with similar payout variances.
Consistent with empirical studies such as Leary and Michaely (2010), the volatility of payout
is not signicantly dierent among rms operating in environments featuring high and low levels
of information asymmetry. However, the estimates of the managerial payout consistency cost
parameter illustrates that information asymmetry is positively related to the perceived cost to
payout reductions. In contrast to the conclusions of Leary and Michaely (2010), information
asymmetry does have an impact on the preference for smooth payout. This shows, when exam-
ining dierent explanations for empirical facts, the importance of structural models which allow
thorough investigation of unobservable managerial preferences.
Columns 5 and 6 contain the parameter estimates for the high and low Pay-Performance
Sensitivity (PPS) subsamples. PPS is a measure of managerial incentives which is estimated as
the dollar value of the CEO's wealth change for a $1,000 change in shareholders' value. Appendix
C elaborates on the calculation of the PPS for each observation. The main component of the
PPS is due to CEO ownership of stock and stock options. We employ PPS to measure how
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closely the CEO's wealth is tied to the shareholders' value. Studies such as Easterbrook (1984)
have suggested that enforcement of a smooth payout is an agency-cost treatment to mitigate the
agency cost of free cash ow. Because all forms of controlling agency costs are themselves costly,
one should expect to see substitution among agency-cost treatments. Payout smoothing should
then become less appealing to the shareholders when the manager's incentives are better aligned
with those of their shareholders.
Consistent with this explanation, we nd that the estimated managerial payout consistency
cost is larger for the subsample of low PPS when compared to the estimated parameter for the
subsample of high PPS (0.129 versus 0.071, respectively). The high PPS group has a payout
variance that is twice as large as the payout variance in the low PPS group.
It is interesting to note that despite a lower payout consistency cost, the cash-to-assets ratio
is larger in the high PPS subsample. We have shown ceteris paribus, a lower payout consistency
cost will result in smaller cash holdings. So, to explain this discrepancy we must examine the
other parameter estimates: the standard deviation of shocks to income and the xed and the
linear equity issuance cost parameters are all larger in the high PPS subsample, while the capital
adjustment cost parameter is smaller. The more uncertain cash ows alongside more costly
access to equity markets and less smooth investment policy lead to higher precautionary motives
for cash holdings. These forces outweigh the eect of the lower payout consistency cost, leading
to a larger cash-to assets ratio in the high PPS group.
In Columns 7 and 8 we estimate our model parameters for subsamples of high and low institu-
tional ownership. The importance of institutional investors in monitoring corporate management
and inuencing payout policy has been investigated in previous studies such as Grinstein and
Michaely (2005). Other studies such as Allen et al. (2000) argue that because of institutional
investors, dividends can induce "ownership clientele" eects. Due to their tax status, managers
can use dividends to attract these investors who have a relative advantage detecting high quality
rms and are valued for their monitoring abilities. Once institutional investors have been at-
tracted, they have the ability to impose a large penalty in response to dividend cuts. Managers of
rms with high level of institutional holdings are therefore more inclined to maintain consistent
payouts.
Our estimates of the managerial payout consistency parameter are in support of Allen et al.
(2000). We nd that rms with lower institutional ownership have managers who associate
smaller perceived costs to reductions in payout. As expected these rms experience higher
payout variances. However, the cash-to-assets ratio is not signicantly dierent between the two
subsamples. This can be explained by noting that while the lower payout consistency cost and
standard deviation of shocks to income induce lower cash balances, the eect of a lower estimated
investment adjustment cost and larger xed equity issuance cost parameter counterbalance these
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forces giving rise to similar cash-to-assets ratios.
Columns 9 and 10 report parameter estimates for high and low share repurchase-to-payout
ratio subsamples. Numerous studies such as Leary and Michaely (2010), Jagannathan et al.
(2000) and Skinner (2008) document signicant time series variation in repurchase payouts in
recent years. This implies that rms typically do not smooth repurchases. While our model does
not distinguish between dividends and repurchases, we are still able to test whether managers of
rms which pay larger fractions of their payouts in the form of repurchases associate less cost to
payout reductions. We construct the ratio of share repurchases to total payout and investigate
whether the managerial payout consistency cost is sensitive to the type of payout chosen by the
rm.
We nd that managers associate less disutility from future payout reductions when they
choose to distribute through more exible share repurchases rather than dividends. This dier-
ence is highlighted by the large dierence in the payout consistency cost parameter estimates of
0.142 for the low repurchase-to-payout ratio group and 0.051 for the high repurchase-to-payout
ratio group.
Finally, we match the simulated to empirical moments using data limited to the years 2002 to
2006. Studies such as Leary and Michaely (2010) have pointed out that the practice of dividend
smoothing has increased over time. Although our focus is on total payout smoothing rather than
dividend smoothing, our structural model allows us to investigate whether the overall managerial
preference for smooth payout has changed in the recent subsample. We also gain insight into the
motives underlying the recent growth in cash holdings. The empirical payout variance for this
subsample is not signicantly smaller than the full sample (0.0013 versus 0.0015). This could
be a consequence of the increased popularity of share repurchases in recent years for which, as
shown in our previous results, managers tend to associate a smaller consistency cost than for
comparable dividend cuts.
We estimate a statistically signicant managerial payout consistency cost parameter of 0.124
which is only slightly larger than its estimate for the full sample. Our results seem to show that
the high observed cash-to-assets ratio (0.22) is mostly due to a larger estimate of the standard
deviation of shocks to income-to-assets (0.337 versus 0.246 in the full sample) rather than as a
side eect of a change in the managerial payout consistency cost. This nding is consistent with
the empirical study of Bates et al. (2009).
In Panel B of Table 3 we report the equity value loss by comparing the rm in which the
manager has incentives to smooth dividends with the same rm where the manager's incentives
are perfectly aligned with the shareholders (γ = 0). We deate the equity value by the rm's
book assets. The reported average value loss is measured as the ratio of the deated equity value
of a rm with aligned incentives to the deated equity value of the rm with parameters derived
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from our estimation. Considering the full sample, removing the incentive to smooth dividends
results in an increase of 6.6% in shareholders equity value. On average, shareholders at large rms
suer a loss of 8.9% in equity value compared to the 1.2% loss imposed on shareholders of small
rms. The largest equity value loss is suered by shareholders of rms who pay a relatively higher
percentage of their distributions in the form of dividends (9.4%). The estimated value losses are
larger for rms which suer from higher information asymmetry, provide less incentives to their
managers through compensation, and have higher institutional ownership. In the subsample of
recent years, the value loss is similar to the loss estimated for the full sample. This indicates
that the eect of payout smoothing on shareholder value has remained constant over time.
5 Conclusion
We develop a discrete-time, innite-horizon, partial equilibrium, stochastic model of payout,
investment, debt and cash holdings. In our model, rms trade o a tax benet of debt against a
recapitalization cost of debt. They also save cash in the presence of costly equity issuance and a
tax penalty on the cash savings accounts. In the base-case model the rm pays out the residual
cash ow after the manager chooses optimal debt, cash and investment policies to maximize
equity value in each period. First, we solve this model numerically using exogenously chosen
parameters. The moments based on this rst-best solution are compared to empirical moments
computed from a sample of U.S. rms from 1988 to 2006. The main inconsistencies are the
overestimated payout and investment variances, and the underestimated average cash-to-assets
ratio.
To address the inconsistencies between the empirical and simulated moments we propose an
agency model. Consistent with the empirical literature on payout smoothing and inspired by
the low level of empirical payout variance, the objective function of the manager is extended to
capture a perceived cost to payout reductions. The functional form of this cost is captured by
an additive linear disutility for cutting corporate payout. We employ SMM by matching a set of
empirical moments with simulated moments, estimating the managerial payout consistently cost
parameter as well as other model parameters such as the persistence and the standard deviation
of the shock to income-to-assets, the payout tax schedule parameter and the equity issuance cost
parameters.
The results indicate that a manager of a typical rm associates a cost to payout reductions
equivalent to ($83,000) for the rst million dollars of shareholders' equity value. The SMM
parameter estimates support the view that on average managers perceive a fairly large cost for
cutting their payout. Moreover, our assumption on the functional form of the payout consistency
cost is validated as our model is able to explain both lower than optimal levels of payout variance
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and investments variance concurrently. This model also helps to explain the high level of corpo-
rate cash holdings. Although, as illustrated by comparative statics, the payout consistency cost
can only partially explain the larger than optimal cash balances. This suggests other possible
explanations for observed excess cash which are beyond the scope of our paper.
We also show that the managerial payout consistency cost accounts for a 6.6% loss in share-
holders' equity value. It is important to note that our model does not include any other agency
conicts, nor does it incorporate any sort of information asymmetry. As suggested in the lit-
erature, dividend smoothing could be adopted as a remedial policy to mitigate other agency
problems or to overcome high levels of information asymmetry and convey credible information
to the market. The estimated shareholders' loss in our paper is relative to the rst-best equity
values for a rm which faces no agency conicts or information asymmetry. One interesting
avenue for future research, therefore, is to attempt to incorporate these other frictions within a
structural model to quantify the possible benets to payout smoothing.
Our comparative statics results show that an increase in the payout consistency cost param-
eter is associated with reductions in the payout ratio and equity issues as well as an increase
in cash balances. We believe that neglecting the joint determination of payout and cash poli-
cies and the dynamic eect of requiring smooth dividends by Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen
(1986) are the main reasons underlying inconsistencies with their suggestions. This highlights
the importance of incorporating a dynamic structural estimation to avoid any sort of endogeneity
problems associated with determination of variables such as payout ratio, and cash holdings.
We further explore heterogeneity of the agency parameter across dierent rms by employing
SMM on sample splits based on various rm-manager characteristics. We provide evidence that
rms which are larger, have larger analyst forecasts dispersion, have larger institutional owner-
ships, which compensate their CEOs with low pay-performance packages, and which distribute
larger fractions of their payout in the form of dividends, have managers who associate larger costs
to cutting their payouts. These results provide partial support for several common explanations
of payout smoothing. Interestingly, like Leary and Michaely (2010), we nd that dierences in
information asymmetry does not lead to signicantly dierent payout variances; however, we
show that this disguises a signicantly larger payout consistency cost parameter estimate for
rms with higher analyst forecast dispersion.
Our study focuses on payout smoothing rather than dividend smoothing. In our model,
when estimating managerial perceived cost to payout reductions, we do not dierentiate between
dividends and share repurchases. However, consistent with the empirical literature, our sample
split results show that rms which distribute cash to their shareholders through repurchase
programs are less inclined to smooth their payout. The dierences in the level of managerial
commitments associated with each of these methods of payout as well as other institutional
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In this section we present a method for solving the bellman equation described in Equation 12.
To simplify the exposition, we consider a slightly abstracted version consistent with conventions
in dynamic programming theory. In particular, Equation 12 can be represented in the following
form:
V (St; θt) = D(St, g(St; θt)) +
1
1 + r
Et[V (tr(St, g(St; θt); θt); θt+1) (15)
A solution consists of a policy g : S × Θ → A which maps a non-stochastic state in S and
stochastic state in Θ to an action in A. The non-stochastic state space S accounts for the capital
Kt, cash Ct and debt Bt. The action space accounts for Kt+1, Ct+1 and ∆Bt+1. The function
Dt : S × A → R is equal to the dividend payment described in Equation (8). The transition
function tr(·) calculates the outstanding debt, and capital and cash on hand at period t+ 1. For
capital, cash, and debt the transition function is trivially equal to the respective action variables.
An approximate solution is found by discretizing the state and action space to generate a
discrete Markov decision problem which is then solved for the optimal policy using a standard
value function iteration algorithm. The state space is composed of an evenly spaced grid with
12 points per variable with the exception of capital stock. Since this is where the majority of
the curvature occurs in the model, we use a more nely spaced grid composed of 24 points.
The auto-regressive process underlying the stochastic state is approximated with a discrete state
Markov chain using the method described in Tauchen (1986). The process is created with 9
states spanning e±3σ. The discretized transition function selects the closest grid point to the
output of the continuous transition function. Ex post, we verify that stable policies do not occur
on any boundary points of the state space variables.
We use a slightly altered version of the above methodology in Appendix D which incorporates
risky debt into the base-case model. In this model equity holder's have the choice to default if the
expected equity value of the rm is negative. The resulting probability of default Ψ is calculated
for the product of states and actions, and results in a signicant increase in computational
complexity.
Together with the fair pricing of debt described in Equation 17, Ψ is used to endogenously
calculate interest rate it. Since fair-pricing itself depends on the value function, the constraint
on interest does not allow the bellman equation to t into the standard dynamic programming
structure. However, under reasonable restrictions on the size of interest payments, the Blackwell
sucient condition can be used to show that adding this penalty imposed by the interest charge to
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Equation 15 still results in a contraction mapping. This result is sucient to show the uniqueness
and existence of a stable optimal solution. The resulting recursive equation is discretized as above
and then solved with an appropriately modied value function iteration algorithm.
B. Simulated Method of Moments
We use SMM to nd a set of parameter values ~Γ∗ which generate simulated moments h∗n(~Γ)
that most closely match empirical moments H∗N . The simulated moments are described by the
vector hn(~Γ) which is composed of 14 elements and depends on selected parameter values ~Γ. The
empirical moments are also described by a 14 element vector HN . The moments used in this
study consist of rst and second order moments of nancial ratios, correlations, and regression
coecients.
The vector ~Γ is composed of the following 11 parameters
~Γ = [γ, λ0, λ1, λ2, a, σ, ρ, ω, q, B̄, φ]
The data moments, ĤN(XN), are constructed as a 14-member vector of statistics computed
from the empirical panel XN which is a data matrix of length N .
In order to estimate the simulated moments, we conduct simulations on the model using a
given parameter vector ~Γ generating S = 6 simulated data sets. ĥsn(x
s
n,
~Γ) is the 14-member
vector of the statistics computed from the simulated panel xsn which is a data matrix of length
n for the particular round of simulation s.
The SMM estimator of the parameter vector ~Γ∗ minimizes the weighted distance between























where ŴN is an arbitrary positive denite matrix that converges in probability to a deterministic
positive denite matrixW . However, we employ the ecient weighting matrix which is the inverse
of the estimated covariance of the moments:
Ŵ effN = (Nvar(ĤN))
−1.
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We use the inuence-function approach in Erickson and Whited (2000) to calculate this covari-
ance matrix.
Hennessy and Whited (2007) show that the indirect estimator (~Γ) is asymptotically normal




















converging in distribution to a χ2 with three degrees of freedom (i.e. the dimension of H minus
the dimension of ~Γ).
Minimizing the error involves a computational search through the space of parameters. We
employ a gradient descent approach augmented by an iterated local search metaheuristic (ILS).
Lourenço et al. (2003) provides a detailed account of this stochastic local search algorithm. Using




= 0 for each parameter Γi). Intuitively, ILS provides a framework for a directed
search through the set of local minima.
C. Data and Sample Selection
Accounting data used in this study is drawn from the annual 2006 COMPUSTAT industrial les.
We ensure that entries are omitted from regulated, nancial and public service rms by deleting
entries where the primary SIC is between 4900 and 4999, between 6000 and 6999, or greater than
9000. From the remaining data we remove any rm-years where data is missing or for which
total assets, or sales are zero or negative. We also lter-out any rms in the sample which have
less than three consecutive years of complete data. The top 1% of the variables in the remaining
data entries are winzorized leaving an unbalanced panel of rms from 1988 to 2006 with between
1966 and 3183 observations per year.
Data variables are dened as follows: book assets is Compustat Item 6; gross capital stock
is Item 7; investment is the dierence between Items 30 and 107; cash ow is the sum of Items
18 and 14; equity issuance is Item 108; total long-term debt is Item 9 plus Item 34; total cash
distributions is the sum of Item 19, Item 21, and Item 115; the stock of cash is Item 1; and sales
is Item 12. The market-to-book ratio's numerator is dened as book assets minus book equity
(item 60) minus balance sheet deferred taxes (item 7) plus the market value of equity (item 199
times item 25). The denominator is book value of assets.
Data on institutional holdings are retrieved from Thomson Financial (previously known as
CDA Spectrum), which contains annual information on institutional ownership of stocks listed
on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. Those institutions usually include bank trusts, insurance com-
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panies, mutual funds, brokerage rms, pension fund and endowments. Individual blockholders
are not covered. We measure institutional holdings using the stock ownership by all the insti-
tutional investors. As a robustness check, following Grinstein and Michaely (2005) and Hartzell
and Starks (2003) we also measure institutional ownership using the proportion of institutional
ownership by the top ve institutional investors in the rm (i.e. the summation of the shares
owned by the top ve institutional investors deated by the rm's total shares outstanding).
Our results are not sensitive to this alternative measure. To measure information asymmetry of
a rm, we calculate the standard deviation of analyst annual earning forecasts from IBES.
The executive compensation data is from ExecuComp. Following Jensen and Murphy (1990),
Pay-Performance Sensitivity (PPS) is the dollar value of the CEO's wealth change for a $1,000
change in shareholders' value. Although managers can receive pay-performance incentives from
a variety of sources, the majority are due to ownership of stock and stock options (Jensen
and Murphy (1990)). Similar to Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) and Core and Guay (1999),
we compute this sensitivity as the dollar value change of stock and options held by a CEO to
a $1,000 shareholder return. For common stock, PPS is simply the fraction of the rm that
the executive owns. PPS for options is the fraction of the rm's stock on which the options are
written multiplied by the options' delta. We use the method developed by Core and Guay (2002)
to estimate option deltas. Their method avoids the cost and diculty of collecting option data
from various proxy statements since it requires information from only the most recent proxy
statements. More importantly, the authors show that their estimates are eectively unbiased
and 99% correlated with the measures obtained if the parameters of a CEO's option portfolio
were completely known.
D. The Base-Case Model with Risky Debt
Here we investigate how the introduction of risky debt would alter our base-case results.32 The
structure of our risky debt model is related to Moyen (2004) and Moyen (2007). These papers
study investment and nancing decisions of a rm within an innite-horizon discrete-time dy-
namic stochastic framework. In Moyen (2004), unlike our model, there is no need for cash since
raising capital is not costly to the rm. In our model with risky debt, rms not only trade o a
tax benet of debt against the expected cost of bankruptcy and the recapitalization cost of debt
but also make decisions on the level of cash holdings in the presence of costly equity issuance.
Although her model includes dividends, the main purpose of her model diers signicantly from
32We previously included risky debt in our base-case model; however, it was suggested by the referee to simplify
the debt structure since the main focus of the paper is not rm capital structure. Risky debt also signicantly
adds to the complexity of the numerical solution. Without using a substantially coarser set of grids, it is not
possible to nd solutions to the SMM problem.
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ours as she studies the dierences in nancial and investment characteristics of rms that face
no nancing constraint with nancially constrained rms.
We construct a discrete-time, innite-horizon, partial equilibrium, stochastic model of debt,
investment and cash holdings. In this model, rms trade o a tax benet of debt against 1) a
default cost of debt and 2) a recapitalization cost for new debt issuances. Similar to the base-case
model, the rm maximizes equity value by choosing its dividend, investment, cash holdings, and
debt policy. However, the rm's optimization is also subject to fair pricing of any debt issue. All
claimants, equity and debt, are risk neutral. The equity value Vt takes the form:
Vt = max
{
0, Dt + T (Dt) + Λ(Dt) +
1




Equation (16) shows that the equity value is the sum of the expected discounted stream of
dividends, Dt. Equation (16) also shows that equity claimants are protected by limited liability.
Equity claimants default whenever Dt + T (Dt) + Λ(Dt) +
1
1+(1−τb)r
Et[Vt+1] ≤ 0. The rm may
ask its equity claimants for additional funds (Dt < 0), but the equity claimants may choose to
relinquish their equity claim rather than contribute more.
Similar to the risk-free debt model, the new debt issue is the dierence between the new debt
level chosen this period Bt+1 and the beginning-of-period debt level Bt as in Equation 6. Each
period the rm can roll over its existing debt ∆Bt+1 = 0, retire some debt ∆Bt+1 < 0, or issue
more debt ∆Bt+1 > 0 at the current interest rate, it+1. Unlike the risk-free debt model, the
interest rate requested by creditors can change in each period. This interest rate becomes larger
as the rm approaches the default boundary. Fair pricing of debt requires that
Bt+1 =
1
1 + (1− τb)r
Et[(1 + (1− τb)it+1)Bt+11(Vt>0) + (R(Kt+1; θt+1)− ξBt+1)1(Vt<0)] (17)
Equation (17) shows that debt claimants demand an interest rate such that the debt lent to
the rm this period equals next period's expected discounted payo. The payo on the debt
claim consists of the face value Bt+1 and the after-tax interest payment (1− τb)it+1Bt+1 if equity
claimants do not default, or the net residual value R(Kt+1; θt+1)− ξBt+1 if they default, where τb
is the debt claimant's interest income tax rate, ξ is the dead weight default cost as a proportion
of the debt face value, and the function 1(Vt>0) indicates no default (i.e. it is equal to one if
Vt > 0 and it is equal to zero other wise).
The residual R(Kt+1, Ct+1; θt1) going to the debt claimant upon default is the value of the
rm after reorganization. Debt claimants may then recapitalize the rm in an optimal manner.
R(Kt+1, Ct+1; θt1) captures the optimal recapitalization:
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R(Kt+1, Ct+1; θt+1) = (1− τc)f(Kt; θt) + τcδKt − It +Bt+1 + Λ(Dt) + T (Dt)− Ω(Bt+1, Bt)Risky
−A(Kt+1, Kt) + (1 + (1− τc)r)Ct − Ct+1 +
1
1 + (1− τb)r
Et[Vt+1] (18)
The net residual value R(Kt+1, Ct+1; θt1) going to the debt claimants upon bankruptcy (i.e.
when Dt + T (Dt) + Λ(Dt) +
1
1+(1−τb)r
Et[Vt+1] ≤ 0) is always less than the no-default principal
after tax interest payment (1 + (1− τb)it)Bt.33
As in the risk-free debt structure, we assume a recapitalization cost for debt. However, due to
incorporating endogenous default, there is no need to include the symmetric debt adjustment cost
and we only include a proportional otation cost of new debt issues. The new recapitalization
cost of debt has the following form
Ω(Bt+1, Bt)Risky = q(Bt+1 −Bt)1(Bt+1>Bt) (19)
As in the risk-free model, parameter q ≥ 0 captures the linear proportional otation cost of new
debt issues.
Using Equations (2),(3), (4), (5), (6), (8), (10), (11), (16), (17), and (19) we can implicitly
express the income shock at which equity claimants trigger default, θ̄(Kt, Bt, it, Ct). This is
calculated by solving Dt + T (Dt) + Λ(Dt) +
1
1+(1−τb)r
Et[Vt+1] = 0 and leads to the following
expression for θ̄(Kt, Bt, it, Ct):
(1− τc)(θ̄(Kt, Bt, it, Ct)Kαt ) + (1− (1− τc)δ)Kt −Kt+1 +Bt+1 − (1 + (1− τc)it)Bt
+(1 + (1− τc)r)Ct − Ct+1 + Λ(Kt, Bt, it, Ct; θ̄(Kt, Bt, it, Ct))− Ω(Bt+1, Bt; θ̄(Kt, Bt, it, Ct))Risky
−A(Kt, Kt+1; θ̄(Kt, Bt, it, Ct)) + T (Kt, Bt, it, Ct; θ̄(Kt, Bt, it, Ct))
+
1
1 + (1− τb)r
Et[Vt+1|θt = θ̄(Kt, Bt, it, Ct)] = 0 (20)
Because εt is normally distributed, the income shock follows a log-normal distribution. As
a result, the probability of default Ψ(θ̄(Kt, Bt, it, Ct)) follows a log-normal cumulative density
function.
In this model, the manager maximizes the equity value of the rm such that equations (2)-(6),
(8)-(11), (17) and (19) are satised. The rm's optimal level of cash holdings depends not only
on the cost of issuing equity, but also on the rm's holdings of risky debt and the probability of
33The fact that the interest is deductible by the rm at a higher rate than the interest income is taxable to
debt claimants (τc > τb), implies that the residual is smaller than the principal and after-tax interest going to
the debt claimants when no default occurs: R(Kt+1, Ct+1; θt1) < (1 + (1− τb)it)Bt.
40
facing costly default. If debt were not risky, the rm could avoid costly equity issues and raise
more debt to nance its new investments. In this set up, the expected cost of default on the
risky debt as well as the otation cost of new debt issues, hand in hand with the cost of issuing
equity, enables us to address the simultaneous existence of debt and cash balances in the rm.
The manager chooses corporate policies which are also constrained by the bond-pricing Equa-
tion (17). She makes these decisions after observing the beginning-of-the-period value for the
income shock θt and last period's choices of capital stock Kt, debt Bt, interest rate it and cash
stock Ct. The Bellman equation describing the rm's intertemporal problem is:





0, Dt + T (Dt) + Λ(Dt) +
1
1 + (1− τb)r
Et[V (Kt+1, Bt+1, it+1, Ct+1; θt+1]
}
subject to Equations (2)-(6), (8)-(11), (17) and (19).
The model cannot be solved analytically. The solution is approximated using numerical
methods. The employed numerical method, discussed in the Appendix B, is similar to the method
used to solve the base-case model with risk-free debt. A sample of 20,000 rms is generated,
where each series for which no default occurs (Vt > 0) for at least 20 consecutive periods denes
a rm. Dropping the rst part of the series allows us to observe the rm after it has worked its
way out of a possibly suboptimal starting point. Nonetheless, the rms do sometimes default.
For example, 0.40% of the rms default in periods 21 to 40. Equity claimants sometimes choose
a debt level that is too dicult to service when the realized next period's income shock turns
out to be much lower than expected.
Here we compare the Euler equation for optimal cash holdings from the base-case model with
risk-free debt (13) with its analog when risky debt is incorporated. The following Euler equation
relates the dynamics of interest and probability of default with changes in cash:
1 + (λ1 − λ2Dt)1(Dt<0) + (−τd + τd exp(−φDt))1(Dt>0)
+
1
1 + (1− τb)r
Et[(τc − τb)it+1 + ξ]Bt+1 ×
×
(∂Ψ[θ̄(Kt+1, Bt+1, it+1, Ct+1]
∂Ct+1
+








1 + (1− τc)r
1 + (1− τb)r
Et[1 + (λ1 − λ2Dt+1)1(Dt+1<0) + (−τd + τd exp(−φDt+1))1(Dt+1>0)]
+
1






The right hand side represents the shadow value of cash balances and the left hand side
represents the marginal cost of external equity nance, the marginal cost from the tax on payout,
plus the marginal cost of default on the debt obligations. In addition to factors present in the
risk-free model, if a rm saves a dollar today, it also inuences both the probability of default
and the interest rate promised to the debt claimants in the next period. This equation shows
that the rm accounts for the eects of its cash holding decision on the interest rate requested
by debt claimants and on the default probability. A higher interest rate it+1 promised to debt
claimants translates into a larger tax benet to the rm, but this higher rate also increases the
probability that equity claimants will default on their debt obligation.
[ Insert Table 4 Here ]
Using the same parameters as the base-case model we solved this model numerically. Similar
to Moyen (2004), the dead weight cost of default is set to ξ = 0.1 to compromise between Fischer
et al. (1989) and Kane et al. (1986), who use 5% and 15% of the debt face value for the dead
weight cost. Table 4 shows the results. As the Euler equation suggested earlier, the average
cash-to-assets ratio is higher than the same ratio in the base-case model with risk-free debt
(0.0694 versus 0.0414). However, similar to the base-case model, it overestimates the variance
of investment-to-assets ratio. More importantly, with respect to payout variance both models
signicantly overshoot this moment. This suggests that, although risky debt inuences corporate
policies such as cash holdings and leverage, it does not help to explain the smooth payout and
investment observed in the data. Furthermore, as in our analysis of the base-case model, the
results from the model including risky debt with endogenous default suggest a need to incorporate
a perceived cost to cutting payout into the manager's utility function.
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Table 1: Exogenously Simulated and Empirical Moments for the Full Sample
This table reports the simulated and empirical moments using the base-case model. The empirical moments
are based on a sample of non-nancial, unregulated rms from the annual 2006 COMPUSTAT industrial les.
The sample period is 1988 to 2006. Estimation is done using the base-case model and the exogenously chosen
parameter values. The simulated panel of rms is generated from the base-case model described in Section 3.1,
and contains 20,000 rms over 40 time periods, where only the last 19 time periods are kept for each rm.
Name of Moments Empirical Moments Simulated Moments
Average Cash/Assets 0.1631 0.0414
Variance of Cash /Assets 0.0436 0.0514
Variance of Investment/Assets 0.0069 0.0139
Average Equity Issuance/Assets 0.0368 0.0305
Variance of Equity Issuance/Assets 0.0593 0.0638
Payout ratio 0.2072 0.2284
Variance of Payout 0.0015 0.0025
Frequency of Paying Out 0.4511 0.4923
Average Debt/Assets 0.2682 0.3142
Variance of Long-Term Debt/Assets 0.0712 0.0858
Frequency of Long-Term Debt Reduction 0.6483 0.5730
Correlation of Payout and Cash/Assets 0.0543 0.2131
Standard Deviation of the Shock to Income/Assets 0.1483 0.1317
Serial Correlation of Income/Assets 0.6091 0.5751
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Table 2: Matching Moments and Estimated Model Parameters for the Full Sample
This table shows empirical and simulated moments with associated parameter estimates. Empirical moments are
based on a sample of non-nancial, unregulated rms from years 1988 to 2006 of the 2006 COMPUSTAT industrial
les. The parameter estimation is done using SMM to match moments of a simulated panel to corresponding
empirical moments. The simulated moments are from a data panel generated from the agency model (Section
3.2) with estimated parameters. This panel includes 20,000 simulated rms for which the last 19 of 40 time
periods are retained. Empirical and simulated moments are reported in Panel A. Panel B reports the estimated
parameters, including p-values in parentheses. Estimated parameters include: the xed, linear and quadratic
equity issuance cost parameters λ0, λ1, λ2; the payout consistency cost parameter γ; the debt adjustment, otation
cost of new debt issues and constant target debt parameters ω, q, B̄; the payout tax schedule parameter φ; the
capital adjustment cost parameter a; and the standard deviation and serial correlation of the cash ow shock
parameters σ, ρ. The nal entry, χ2, reports the chi-squared statistic for the test of the overidentifying restrictions.
Its p-value is reported in parentheses.
Panel A: Moments
Name of Moments Empirical Moments Simulated Moments
Average Cash/Assets 0.1631 0.1458
Variance of Cash /Assets 0.0436 0.0354
Variance of Investment/Assets 0.0069 0.0061
Average Equity Issuance/Assets 0.0368 0.0316
Variance of Equity Issuance/Assets 0.0593 0.0503
Payout ratio 0.2072 0.1929
Variance of Payout 0.0015 0.0013
Frequency of Paying Out 0.4511 0.4532
Average Debt/Assets 0.2682 0.2693
Variance of Long-Term Debt/Assets 0.0712 0.0606
Frequency of Long-Term Debt Reduction 0.6483 0.6328
Correlation of Payout and Cash/Assets 0.0543 0.0594
Standard Deviation of the Shock to Income/Assets 0.1483 0.1501
Serial Correlation of Income/Assets 0.6091 0.6169
Panel B: Estimated Parameters
λ0 λ1 λ2 γ ω q
0.481 0.070 0.0002 0.113 0.045 0.042
(0.084) (0.037) (0.123) (0.048) (0.085) (0.079)
B̄ φ a ρ σ χ2
13.541 0.318 0.541 0.681 0.246 7.42





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4: Exogenously Simulated and Empirical Moments for the Full Sample: The Risky Debt
Model
This table reports the simulated and empirical moments using the base-case model with risky debt. The empirical
moments are based on a sample of non-nancial, unregulated rms from the annual 2006 COMPUSTAT industrial
les. The sample period is 1988 to 2006. Estimation is done using the base-case model including risky debt and
the exogenously chosen parameter values. The simulated panel of rms is generated from the base-case model
with risky debt as described in Appendix D, and contains 20,000 rms over 40 time periods, where only the last
19 time periods are kept for each rm.
Name of Moments Empirical Moments Simulated Moments
Average Cash/Assets 0.1631 0.0694
Variance of Cash /Assets 0.0436 0.0483
Variance of Investment/Assets 0.0069 0.0126
Average Equity Issuance/Assets 0.0368 0.0963
Variance of Equity Issuance/Assets 0.0593 0.0698
Payout ratio 0.2072 0.2013
Variance of Payout 0.0015 0.0024
Frequency of Paying Out 0.4511 0.4839
Average Debt/Assets 0.2682 0.1905
Variance of Long-Term Debt/Assets 0.0712 0.0786
Frequency of Long-Term Debt Reduction 0.6483 0.6893
Correlation of Payout and Cash/Assets 0.0543 0.2067
Standard Deviation of the Shock to Income/Assets 0.1483 0.1012











































































































































































































































Payout Tax Schedule  (φ)
Figure 1: Sensitivity Analysis of Model Moments to Payout Parameters
This gure shows comparative statics relating rst, the Payout Consistency Cost parameter (γ) with 1) variance
of payout, 2) payout ratio, 3) frequency of paying out, 4) cash-to-assets ratio, 5) equity issuance-to-assets ratio, 6)
variance of investment-to-assets ratio, 7) standard deviation of the shock to income-to-assets ratio, and, second,
the Payout Tax Schedule parameter (φ) with 8) variance of payout, 9) payout ratio, and 10) frequency of paying
out.
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